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This article contends that international criminal justice provides minimal general
deterrence of future violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).
Arguments that international courts and tribunals deter future violations - and
that such deterrence is a primary objective - assume an internally inconsistent
burden that the processes cannot bear, in essence setting international criminal
justice up for failure. Moreover, the inherently limited number of proceedings,
the length of time required, the dense opinions generated, the relatively light
sentences 2 and the robust confinement conditions 3 all erode whatever limited
1
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See e.g. Kate Cronin-Furman, "Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the Prospects for
Deterrence of Mass Atrocity", InternationalJournalof TransitionalJustice, 2013, pp. 1 21; Michael Broache,
"The International Criminal Court and Atrocities in DRC: A Case Study of the RCD-Goma (Nkunda
Faction)/CNDP/M23 Rebel Group", September 2014, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2434703; Geoff Dancy, Bridget Marchesi, Florencia Montal and Kathryn Sikkink, "The ICC's
Deterrent Impact -What the Evidence Shows", Open Democracy, 3 February 2015, available at: www.
opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/geoff dancy-bridget-marchesi-florencia-montal-kathryn-sikkink/icc%
E2%80%99s-deterrent-impac (all internet references were accessed in June 2015).
Special thanks to two colleagues at SMU Dedman School of Law, Professor Jenia Turner and research
librarian Cassie DuBay, as well as Mariya Nikolova and Ellen Policinski of the Review for their
assistance. Additionally, I appreciate Dr. Guido Acquaviva's suggestions and the manner in which he
facilitated dialogue on this important topic.
Relative at least compared to the United States. See Jens David Ohlin, "Towards a Unique Theory of
International Criminal Sentencing", in Goran Sluiter and Sergey Vasiliev (eds), InternationalCriminal
Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law, Cameron May, UK, 2009, p. 373: "When compared
against sentences handed down in the United States for regular crimes, the sentences of international
criminal tribunals are typically far lower, even though the crimes at these tribunals are far greater in
both moral depravity and legal significance."
See Doreen Carvajal, "Accused of War Crimes, and Living with Perks", New York Times, 3 June 2010,
available
at:
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/world/europe/04iht-hague.html?pagewanted-all&_r=0,
describing pre-trial confinement conditions at the International Criminal Court (ICC).
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general deterrence international criminal justice might otherwise provide. Bluntly
stated, thousands of pages of multiple Tadit decisions have not factored into any
service member's decision-making on whether to comply with IHL.
International criminal justice can play many roles, 4 including fostering
compliance with IHL, but not through general deterrence and the threat of
punishment. Adherence to IHL is an indirect byproduct of international criminal
justice as a moral statement, an explication of how the international community
views certain actions in armed conflict. This statement, often translated by
military legal advisers and conveyed to service members by military leaders
through personal example, briefings, training exercises, and military manuals and
regulations, reinforces behavioural norms of how to conduct oneself in the most
immoral of circumstances: armed conflict. International criminal justice's moral
statement aids service members in navigating the moral abyss which results from
a State lawfully ordering them to intentionally direct lethal force against fellow
human beings.5 The result is service members who, in the aftermath of armed
conflict, can live with themselves and the decisions they made during armed
conflict. In the process, and in part as an indirect result of international criminal
justice, the arc of service members' behaviour tends towards complying with IHL.6
This article first clarifies what is meant by "general deterrence" before
reviewing how the claim that international criminal justice provides such
deterrence is relatively new and stems from misunderstandings of what the
International Criminal Court (ICC) can achieve. From there, the article explains
how general deterrence is a challenging proposition for any criminal justice
system and amounts to an unbearable burden at the international level. I then
describe the indirect role that international criminal justice plays in providing if
not moral clarity, then at a minimum, less moral ambiguity in defining by
exception the bounds of permissible conduct during armed conflict.

General deterrence?
The focus of this article is on general deterrence, understood as the theory that
criminally punishing an offender for violating the law dissuades others from
similar violations. I recognize that some commentators, to varying degrees, reject
general deterrence in the context of international criminal justice.7 Others claim
4

5
6

7

These roles include, but are certainly not limited to, contributing to peace and reconciliation and, as
discussed in this note, derivatively and minimally providing general deterrence through active or
positive complementarity.
On this point, see also Geoffrey S. Corn, "Contemplating the True Nature of the Notion of 'Responsibility'
in Responsible Command", in this issue of the Review.
See American Public Media, "'Moral Injury': An Invisible Wound of War", available at: www.wbur.org/
series/moral-injury, detailing the moral challenges veterans face in returning home after having "been a
part of something that betrays their sense of right and wrong" during combat.
See Jens David Ohlin's claim that deterrence is only partially relevant to international criminal justice and
Mark Drumbl's argument that it is irrelevant. J. D. Ohlin, above note 2; Mark Drumbl, "Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity", Northwestern Law Review,
Vol. 99, No. 2, 2005, p. 590.
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that what is problematic is not general deterrence per se, but attempting to "ascribe
deterrent aims to (or judge deterrence in the context of) single international criminal
courts or tribunals".8 I don't disagree. My point is that, as explained below, many
influential figures began promoting international criminal justice's general
deterrent effects twenty years ago. They have not only retrospectively discovered
general deterrent effects, but also claim these effects are the primary goal of
international criminal law. Since this reconceptualization occurred in the mid1990s, commentators - and international courts - have attempted to fit the square
peg of general deterrence into the round hole of international criminal justice.'
Obviously, general deterrence is distinct from individual or specific
deterrence - the theory that punishing an offender deters that particular offender
from a future violation. Relatively speaking, the efficacy of a criminal justice
system providing specific deterrence is easier to evaluate: it can be seen in the
number of specific individuals who, having been punished for violating IHL, do
or do not re-offend. Yet there is considerable debate on how well international
criminal justice provides even specific deterrence.' 0 That there is debate on the
specific deterrence aspects of international criminal justice is (or should be) a
harbinger of the system's inability to provide the more abstract general
deterrence." If opponents of international criminal justice were behind the claims
that the system provides general deterrence, the argument would be viewed as a
straw man. Yet the unbearable burden of deterrent effect derives not from critics
of international criminal justice but, as discussed below, from supporters.

8

See Guido Acquaviva's response to this piece, "International Criminal Courts and Tribunals as Actors of
General Deterrence? Perceptions and Misperceptions", in this issue of the Review.
9
See Barbara Hola, "Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing
Case Law", Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2012, explaining that at least in terms of the ICTY and
ICTR, "judges clearly found inspiration in classic 'domestic' penal theories", and that "[iln general,
deterrence and retribution are emphasized in the majority of cases"; Geoff Dancy and Florencia
Montal, "Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why International Criminal Court Investigations
Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions", paper presented to the American Society of
International Law Research Forum, 20 January 2015, discussing how the ICC may be achieving
positive complimentary but "of a sort initially unintended by the Court"; Hyeran Jo and Beth
A. Simmons, "Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?", Working Paper Series, 18
December 2014, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2552820, describing
how the ICC may indirectly bolster prosecutorial deterrence at the national level.
10 Nick Grono and Anna de Courcy Wheeler, "The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of
International Crimes by Government Leaders", Presentation, International Crisis Group, 5 October
2012, available at: www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2012/grono-the-deterrent-effectof the-icc.aspx. Grono and Wheeler, while defending the idea that the ICC has deterred commission of
crimes, concede that the ICC involves "the very situations where prosecutions are most unlikely to deter".
11 Philipp Kastner, "Armed Conflicts and Referrals to the International Criminal Court: From Measuring
Impact to Emerging Legal Obligations", Journal of InternationalCriminalJustice, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2014,
p. 472. Helena Cobban called deterrence the "false hope of international justice". See Helena Cobban,
"Think Again: International Courts", Foreign Policy, February 2006, available at: www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2006/02/17/think-again-internationalcourts. Yet others claim that international criminal
justice does provide a deterrent effect. See Payam Akhavan, "Beyond Impunity: Can International
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?", American Journal of InternationalLaw, Vol. 95, No. 1,
2001, arguing that there is such a deterrent effect; Theodor Meron, "From Nuremburg to The Hague",
Military Law Review, Vol. 149, 1995, p. 110, arguing that if war crimes trials were "made a consistent
reality, deterrence would be taken more seriously".
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Establishing that criminal prosecutions, at any level, generally deter others
from committing the same or similar offences is challenging. It requires proving a
negative: that the prosecution of person X for violating IHL deterred Y and Z in
the future from similar violations. When Y and Z are not violating IHL, there is
debate over the negative causation - proving why Y and Z are not committing
violations. Rarely will individuals acknowledge general deterrence.1 2 And when Y
and Z do violate IHL in a manner similar to X, it would seem to present more
straightforward evidence of the lack of general deterrence. Despite these
challenges, or perhaps because of them, the idea that international criminal
justice provides meaningful general deterrence is a relatively recent phenomenon.

General deterrence and international criminal justice
Contemporary international criminal justice relies in large part on the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremburg following World War II. Yet the IMT's
primary purpose was punitive - the "just and prompt trial and punishment of the
major war criminals of the European Axis".' 3 The primary purpose of
international criminal justice remained punitive up to and through the creation
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR). As one commentator notes, the UN Security Council resolutions
establishing the ICTY and ICTR were focused on
incapacitating specific offenders by removing them from the field of combat
and preventing them from maintaining political power ... there is no clear
language suggesting that the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals was
intended to serve the purpose of preventing the commission of war crimes by
potential offenders. General deterrence does not seem to have been a primary
goal of the architects of the ad hoc tribunals.'4

12 There are exceptions to that general proposition, however. For example, according to a UN official, the
ICC convicting Thomas Lubanga for conscripting child soldiers has deterred others: "Let me that say
that from my own experience the Prosecution and trials of the ICC are followed with great interest in
the field. The deterrent effect of these proceedings is already being felt with regard to a large number
of armed groups engaging with the United Nations to release children from their ranks and to cease all
new recruitment." ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-223-ENG, 7 January 2010, paras 9-10. See also H. Jo and
B. A. Simmons, above note 9, discussing the fear of ICC prosecution expressed by former Colombian
president Andres Pastrana as well as by Colombian paramilitary leaders.
13 K. Cronin-Furman, above note 1.
14 Ibid., p. 436 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). Cronin-Furman contends that several years
passed after the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR before scholars began attributing to the
tribunals the effect of general deterrence. This was around the same time that the international
community created the Rome Statute and the ICC; ibid., pp. 436 ff. See also Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (IMT), 8 August 1945, UN Doc. A/CN.4/5, Art. 6, available at: http:I/
avalon.aw.yale.edu/int/imtconst.asp, stating that the Allies established the IMT "for the trial and
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries".

779

qks and G. AcquE

Not until the "international epiphany"15 of the 1998 Rome Statute did the
international community formally embrace the idea that international criminal
justice provided general deterrence. The Rome Statute itself reflects that the States
Parties were "[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes", as they "threaten
the peace, security and the well-being of the world".1 6 Ending impunity for
perpetrators is specific or individual deterrence, but preventing others from
committing crimes in the future is general deterrence. Indeed, general deterrence is
"the most important goal of the ICC".'7 The former president of the ICC claimed

that "[b]y putting potential perpetrators on notice that they may be tried before the
Court, the ICC is intended to contribute to the deterrence of these crimes"."
While the States Parties adopted the Rome Statute in 1998, preparatory work
began in 1995.19 The idea that the ICC would generally deter the commission of
atrocity crimes in the future "became a major selling point among advocates for the
ICC's establishment and ratification". 20 At the same time as the Preparatory
Committee for the ICC was drafting early versions of what would become the
Rome Statute, scholars began to reassess the ad hoc tribunals in terms of general
deterrence despite that not having been a focus at their inception. 21 In 1996, Cherif
Bassiouni outlined a view which was later adopted prospectively in terms of the
ICC and retrospectively for the ad hoc tribunals. Bassiouni argued that "[t]he
relevance of prosecution and other accountability measures to the pursuit of peace
is that through their effective application they serve as deterrence, and thus prevent
further victimization". 22 General deterrence's migration from the ICC to the ad hoc
tribunals continued and expanded such that by 2004, prosecutors from the ICC, the
ICTY, the ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone had issued a joint statement
expressing their commitment to general deterrence in preventing future atrocities. 23
15

John Washburn, "The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and
International Law Making in the 21st Century", Pace InternationalLaw Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999.
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (entered into force 1 July 2002), UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, Preamble (emphasis added).
17 David Hoile, Justice Denied: The Reality of the InternationalCriminalCourt, Africa Research Centre, 2014,
p. 228, quoting both the first Prosecutor ofthe ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, and Christine Chung, the first
senior trial attorney in the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor.
18 Howard Salter (ed.), "Mr. Philippe Kirsch: President and Chief Judge of the ICC", Global Solutions
Quarterly: The Newsletter of Citizens for Global Solutions, Fall 2005, p. 2, available at: globalsolutions.
org/files/public/documents/Newsletter-2005-fall.pdf.
19 See J. Washburn, above note 15.
20 K. Cronin-Furman, above note 1, p. 438, quoting Diane F. Orentlicher, "Judging Global Justice: Assessing
the International Criminal Court", Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2003, p. 498.
21 K. Cronin-Furman, above note 1, p. 436, note 13, referring to Payam Akhavan, "Justice in The Hague,
Peace in the Former Yugoslavia", Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1998, pp. 737-816, and
David Wippman, "Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice", Fordham
InternationalLaw Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1999, pp. 473-478.
22 M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability", Law and
ContemporaryProblems, Vol. 59, No. 4, 1996, p. 18.
23 Louis Moreno Ocampo, Carla Del Ponte, Hassan Bubacar Jallow and David Crane, Joint Statement of the
Prosecutors of the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, and the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 27
November 2004, available at: www.iccnow.org/documents/JointDeclarationProsecutors26Nov4.pdf
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General deterrence as an unbearable burden for international
criminal justice
While providing (and proving) general deterrence is a challenge for any criminal
justice system, the challenge is much greater in the international context given
the limited jurisdiction of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals. These fora have
limited mandates and resources, which understandably results in their only
prosecuting some of the most serious offenders. Yet current research indicates
that it is the certainty of punishment which is most likely to produce general
deterrence. 24 By definition, international criminal justice cannot offer anything
close to certainty of punishment. 2 5
Whatever vestige of general deterrence international criminal justice might
claim dissipates along a spectrum of the inexorable time and length required. The
greater the temporal gap between the offence and issuing the trial judgment, and
the greater the length and opaqueness of that judgment, the less the deterrent
effect. The case of Momcilo Perikid is, unfortunately, instructive on both points.
Perikid allegedly violated IHL in 1995. The ICTY announced criminal charges
against him in 2005. The ICTY then began the trial in 2008, yielding a trial
judgment in 2011 requiring over 600 pages. In 2013, an appeals chamber granted
Perikid's appeal, reversing the trial judgment and leaving the elements of aiding
and abiding liability either in doubt or at least in confusion. Imagine a military
legal adviser preparing to talk to senior military leaders and explain the "so
what?" takeaway or lesson(s) learned from Perigit. What bright line, articulable
rule or principle could the legal adviser say Perigit established or clarified? What
actions does the Perigitjudgment deter other senior leaders from taking?
I contend that military legal advisers would not even raise Perigit because
they either (1) have not read the judgment, given its length and/or lack of clarity,
(2) do not understand the judgment if they have read it (this barb is directed at
the ICTY and not the military legal advisers), or (3) have read and understood
the judgment but recognize that it cannot be meaningfully translated into
anything resembling helpful legal advice. For the judgment to have even the
potential of general deterrence, a military legal adviser would need to be able to
finish the following sentence "Sir/Ma'am, in light of Perigit, you should avoid the
following actions...". That a military legal adviser cannot do so means the
judgment cannot possibly deter others. It is fine to speak of law in terms of
expressive value and signalling effects, but at some point, to be of practical utility,
the law must be able to be clearly articulated, distilled and conveyed to the
category of individuals that the international community seeks to influence.

24 Valerie Wright, "Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment", Report,
The Sentencing Project, Washington, DC, November 2010.
25 One study claims that the ICTR "might eventually prosecute approximately 0.005% of the pool of the
likely humanitarian offenders" in the Rwandan genocide. Thus the ICTR would prosecute
approximately half of one percent of offenders, or stated in the alternative, not prosecute 99.5% of the
offenders. Julian Ku and Jide Nzebile, "Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?", Washington University Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, 2006, p. 808.
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Thus, despite all the time, effort and resources that it entailed, Perigitconfuses
more than clarifies the law, precluding even de minimus general deterrence. Most
international criminal justice cases do play a role in fostering compliance with IHL,
but it's neither accurate nor helpful to think of that role in general deterrence terms.
For international criminal justice to generally deter IHL violations, there
would need to be exponentially more cases and more easily understandable
judgments issued closer in time to the underlying IHL violations. And that is
fully at odds with the nature of international criminal justice. The idea of general
deterrence is even more problematic at the ICC, as increasing the number of
cases at the international level is at cross purposes from what should be the
primary measure of the Court's effectiveness - domestic criminal justice capacitybuilding - rendering the Court if not unnecessary then seldom used.26
Arguing that international criminal justice provides general deterrence is
akin to the tale of Sisyphus, who in Greek mythology was sentenced by the Gods
to perpetually roll a boulder up a hill without ever being able to reach the top
only in this context it is worse, as proponents of general deterrence are seeking
out the boulder.

International criminal justice as a moral touchstone
Yet regardless of how long the process takes and how convoluted the judgments may
be, international criminal justice constitutes a moral statement - the international
community's expectations of how belligerents are to conduct themselves during
armed conflict. Ultimately this leads to greater IHL compliance, but not because
of the unbelievably remote prospect of being in the dock at an international
criminal proceeding. Rather, international criminal justice fosters compliance
because it aids leaders in their efforts to protect service members' morality, their
ability to live with the emotional consequences of knowing they have killed other
human beings. IHL, along with the international criminal justice institutions
interpreting it, provides a moral touchstone, the significance of which should not
be understated - or miscast as deterrence.
As Telford Taylor reminds us, "[w]ar is not a license at all, but an obligation
to kill for reasons of state". 27 We know that "most soldiers have a phobia-like
resistance to using force and need to be specifically trained to kill". 28 Thus a

26 See Election of the Prosecutor, Statement by Mr Moreno Ocampo, ICC-OTP-20030502-10 22, 22 April
2003, stating that "[t]he efficiency of the International Criminal Court should not be measured by the
number of cases that reach the court or by the content of its decisions. Quite on the contrary, because
of the exceptional character of this institution, the absence of trials led by this court as a consequence
of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be its major success."
27 Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, IL, 1970,
pp. 40-41 (emphasis added).
28 Geoffrey S. Corn, Laurie L. Blank, Chris Jenks and Eric Talbot Jensen, "Belligerent Targeting and the
Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule", International Law Studies, Vol. 89, p. 623, note 254,
referencing Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society,
Little, Brown & Co., Boston, MA, 1995.
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significant part of military training does just that -it breaks down the natural
human instinct against killing a fellow human being. Overcoming the instinct
against killing is but one half of the challenge, however; doing so within the
bounds of IHL is the other.

Conclusion
"War is, at its very core, the absence of order, and the absence of order leads very
easily to the absence of morality... "29 The absence of order is so profound that
even delayed, long, and convoluted international criminal judgments are
navigational lights, however dim, for service members traversing the moral abyss
of armed conflict. The idea of international criminal law as a series of faint
waypoints in a deep moral fog is distinct from its role (if it even has one) in
providing general deterrence.
International criminal law in general deterrence terms essentially means
that a soldier would avoid doing as, say, Tadid did because the punishment Tadid
received had deterred the soldier. This simply doesn't happen.3 0 Instead,
international criminal justice is a tether, an anchor in the good sense, which helps
military leaders develop and preserve the good order and discipline necessary to
be an effective fighting force. There is an exceedingly remote chance that a
service member will face international criminal justice for violating IHL, but there
is a 100% chance that a service member will have to live with the consequences
of what they do in armed conflict. 3 1

29 James R. McDonough, Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat, Ballantine Publishing Group,
New York, 1985, p. 78.
30 See J. D. Ohlin, above note 2, pp. 385-386, stating: "Those who kill and rape civilians are motivated by a
variety of factors - genocidal hatred, war-induced rage, etc. - and most of these are not the types of
motivations that can be altered by the knowledge that, possibly, just possibly, one might face criminal
liability at an ad hoc or permanent international tribunal."
31 For an example of the moral consequences of armed conflict, consider U.S. Army paratrooper Staff
Sergeant Tom Blakely, who parachuted into France as part of Operation Overlord, the Allied forces'
invasion of Nazi-controlled Europe in World War II. Blakely's unit was behind enemy lines and
ordered to seize and hold a bridge to prevent the German military from reinforcing its positions at
Normandy beach. While in defensive positions, Blakely's platoon leader ordered each US soldier to
identify not a direction to fire, but a specific German soldier. Blakely, now a docent at the World War
II Museum in New Orleans, said: "I picked one out. I picked him out, got a site, hand on the trigger,
and pulled it. I could see when the bullet hit him. He jumped up in the air, raised his arms above his
head, and dropped his rifle and fell backwards." This engagement was fully in compliance with IHL,
but it nonetheless took a moral toll on Blakely. The German soldier he shot and killed haunted him:
"He came to me from that day on every so often .... There was never any rhyme or reason when he
came and when he left. Sometimes he would do that three or four times, sometimes he'd only do it
once. But it was always somethin'. He was always there. And he came vividly in my mind often." And
this is a case where the service member followed IHL. The external validation and reinforcement that
indirectly flows from international criminal justice that one's actions in combat were permissible and
legitimate is of significant utility. It is just not general deterrence. See CBS News, "A 'Living Artifact'
of WWII Shares His Story", 26 May 2013, available at: www.cbsnews.com/news/a-living-artifact-of
wwii-shares-his -story/.
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A US Army officer writing on his experience as a small-unit leader during
the Vietnam war acknowledged that:
I had to do more than keep them alive. I had to preserve their human dignity. I
was making them kill, forcing them to commit the most uncivilized of acts, but
at the same time I had to keep them civilized. That was my duty as their leader. . .
War gives the appearance of condoning almost everything, but men must live
with their actions for a long time afterward. A leader has to help them
understand that there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to
normalcy, to order, to humanity. 32
International criminal justice can help reinforce that link and, in so doing,
indirectly fosters IHL compliance. It does so by disseminating societal norms by
exception: from knowing how service members may not act, we indirectly
reinforce how they should act in hostilities. This happens not necessarily because
of the fear of a potential future international criminal prosecution that
statistically speaking will almost never occur, but by helping to foster and
maintain a moral sense of self with which the soldier can live, both during and in
the years after armed conflict. However, we do international criminal justice a
disservice by imposing the concept of general deterrence. International criminal
justice cannot, and need not, bear the burden.

Guido Acquaviva*
Dr Guido Acquaviva is Senior Legal Officer at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Chambers). Prior to
that, he worked at the ICTY as a Legal Officer. Dr Acquaviva has lectured at the Geneva Academy of
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, at the LLM in International Crime and Justice at
UNICRI, University of Turin, and at the University of Milan- Bicocca, and has published extensively on
public international law and international criminal law.
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J. R. McDonough, above note 29, pp. 77-78.
Special thanks to the anonymous reviewers of the Review and to Professor Jenks for the interesting
exchange of perspectives on this topic. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Special Tribunal or any other institution with which he is associated.
The author can be reached at guido-acquaviva@yahoo.com.

